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MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
"DISCREDITABLE CONDUCT" AS A STANDARD FOR
RESTRICTING POLITICAL ACTIVITY*
ARTICLE 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 1 is a catch-all pro-
vision, authorizing punishment of conduct deemed a military offense, but not
covered by one of the more specific articles of the Code.2 Under article 134,
courts-martial may punish (1) conduct prejudicial to good order and disci-
pline ;3 (2) conduct of a nature to bring discredit on the armed forces ;4 and
*United States v. Blevens, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 480, 18 C.M.R. 104 (1955).
1. 64 STAT. 142 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 728 (1952). This provision, originally derived
from the British military law, has been part of the United States system of military justice
since the first American Articles of War of 1775. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECE-
DENTS 720, 957 (2d ed., 1920 reprint).
2. WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 1, at 720; see also MILITARY JUsTIcE PROCEDURE
TMI 27-255, at 2 (1945).
Conduct lacking essential elements of civil crimes can be punished under the first or
second clause of art. 134. United States v. Long, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 60, 65, 6 C.M.R. 60, 65
(1952); United States v. Herndon, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 461, 4 C.M.R. 53 (1952). Art. 134,
however, cannot be used to eliminate essential elements of crimes specifically treated by
the other punitive articles. See, e.g., United States v. Hallet, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 378, 15 C.M.R.
378 (1954) (conduct which would be misbehavior before the enemy under art. 99 if
cowardice were established, cannot be "failure to perform duty in the presence of the
enemy" under art. 134) ; United States v. Norris, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 236, 8 C.M.R. 36 (1953)
(conduct which would be "larceny" under art. 121 if intent were established, can not be
"wrongful taking" under art. 134).
3. Any act of a serviceman can conceivably affect military discipline. But only con-
duct which is directly prejudicial to military order or discipline may be punished under
this clause. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, at 213a (1951)
(hereinafter cited as MANUAL). See United States v. Snyder, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 425-26,
4 C.M.R. 15, 17-18 (1952).
Conduct which is too remotely related to military order and discipline to be punished
under this clause may nevertheless be punishable under art. 134 as conduct of a nature to
discredit the armed forces or as a crime not capital. MANUAL ff 213b. See also notes 4
and 5 infra.
4. "Discredit" has been further defined as meaning "to injure the reputation of."
MANUAL II 213b.
The discreditable conduct clause applies to any offense not punishable under other
articles of the Code or under other clauses of art. 134. LEGAL AND LEGIsLATI BASIS,
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, at 294-95 (1951); MANUAL ff 213b.
Though any misconduct may discredit the armed forces, the discreditable conduct clause
has been restricted to conduct having a direct effect on the reputation of the armed forces.
See United States v. Snyder, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 425, 4 C.M.R. 15, 17 (1952) ; LEGAL AND
LEGISLATIvE BASIS, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, at 295 (1951).
Cf. United States v. Creath, 66 B.R. 211 (1947); AYcocK & WuR'sL, MILITARY LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 71 (1955).
This clause was first added to the General Article in 1916, 39 STAT. 666 (1916), for the
"single purpose" of subjecting retired enlisted men to punishment by court-martial for the
same conduct for which retired officers were already punishable. Testimony of the Judge
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(3) crimes not capital.5 On its face, the article may reach activity which, in a
civilian context, would invoke First Amendment safeguards. And in United
States v. Blevens,6 the discreditable conduct clause of article 134 was used as
a means of punishing affiliation of a political nature. Although a First Amend-
ment problem was clearly present, the court failed to discuss the two vital
problems in the case: whether the First Amendment applies to military per-
sonnel, and, if so, whether the discreditable conduct clause of article 134 can
constitutionally be used to punish political activity.
In Blevens, an army private was convicted under the discreditable conduct
clause for "affiliating . .. with a group advocating the violent overthrow of
the United States Government" with knowledge of the group's purpose.
7
Blevens was stationed in the West Zone of Berlin. Faced with the possibility
of court-martial for another offense, he twice fled to East Germany, remain-
ing there for a total of six months." While in East Germany, Blevens was
given living accommodations and funds by agents of the East German State
Security Service (SSD). 9 He attended a Communist school and was placed
in a clerical job by the SSD. Requested by SSD agents to give a written
opinion on Communism, Blevens submitted an article which he copied directly
Advocate General of the Army, Hearings Before the Military Affairs Committec on
Revision of the Articles of War, 1912-1920, at 83, reprinted in LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE
BASIS, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, at 295 (1951). Within a
few years the "single purpose" became merely the "principal object," A MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARany 283 (1917), and then only "another principal object," A
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. Aimy 462 (1920). Though this clause may still be
employed for its original purpose, the present Manual does not even mention this use.
See MANUAL 213b.
5. Only federal crimes and offenses are punishable under this clause. MANUAL ff 213c.
Violations of local state or foreign law may be punishable under the first or second clause
of art. 134. Ibid. See United States v. Freeman, 15 C.M.R. 639, 642-44 (1954) (state
law) ; United States v. Wolverton, 10 C.M.R. 641 (1953) (foreign law) ; United States
v. Thompson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 620, 622-23, 14 C.M.R. 38, 40-41 (1954) (dictum) (state law).
Most capital crimes are punishable under specific punitive articles of the Code. See,
generally, arts. 77-132.
6. 5 U.S.C.M.A. 480, 18 C.M.R. 104 (1955).
7. The specification of the charge against Blevens read as follows:
"In that Private-2 Robert D. Blevens [did] ... wrongfully, unlawfully and know-
ingly affiliate himself with a group, to wit: State Security Service of the East Zone
of Germany, advocating the violent overthrow of the United States Government, he,
the said Robert D. Blevens, then knowing the purpose thereof."
Id. at 483, 18 C.M.R. at 107.
8. Blevens stayed in East Germany for two and one-half months on his first flight
there. He was taken into military custody upon his return to the West Zone of Berlin and
confined in the stockade pending investigation. Within two weeks, Blevens escaped from
the stockade with the aid of Russian agents and again fled to East Germany where he re-
mained for three and one-half months. On his second return to the West Zone, he was
apprehended by French police and turned over to American military authorities. Id. at
487-89, 18 C.M.R. at 111-13.
9. The SSD, an agency of the East German Government, controls internal security
and is also concerned with espionage and propaganda. Id. at 486, 18 C.M.R. at 116.
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from a Communist treatise.10 Upon returning to West Berlin, he was found
guilty by a general court-martial of two acts of desertion and of escape from
confinement, in addition to his conviction on the charge of discrediting the
armed forces."'
In affirming Blevens' conviction, the United States Court of Military Ap-
peals failed to recognize that the way in which the article 134 charge was
stated presented constitutional issues of freedom of expression. 12 The govern-
ment had originally sought to establish that Blevens, by violating the Smith
Act,13 had committed a "crime not capital" punishable under the third clause
of article 134 .14 But the charge, though couched in the language of a Smith
Act indictment, omitted an essential element of a Smith Act offense, since it
failed to allege a specific intent on the part of the accused to overthrow the
government by force and violence. 15 Despite this omission the Court of Mili-
10. Blevens also authorized an agent of the SSD to edit any future articles that he
might write. Id. at 488, 18 C.M.R. at 112.
11. Blevens was sentenced to thirteen years' confinement at hard labor. The maximum
prison sentence authorized for each of the charges is: two years for desertion terminated
voluntarily; three years for desertion terminated by apprehension; one year for escape from
confinement. MANUAL ff 127c, at 220, 221. The court held the maximum permissible
prison sentence for the discreditable conduct conviction was ten years. 5 U2S.C.M.A. at
491-92, 18 C.M.R. at 115-16. Thus at least seven years of Blevens' sentence must have
been based on the discreditable conduct conviction.
12. In past cases, the Court of Military Appeals has not been reluctant to discuss con-
stitutional issues at length. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 227, 11
C.M.R. 220, 227 (1953). See also United States v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 16 C.M.R.
83 (1954); United States v. Thompson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 620, 622-23, 14 C.M.R. 38, 40-41,
(1954).
13. The Smith Act prohibits affiliation with any group advocating the violent over-
throw of the government. 18 U.S.C. § 2385, para. 3 (1952).
14. Compare the specification set out at note 7 supra, with the indictment in United
States v. Lightfoot, 228 F.2d 861, 863 (7th Cir. 1956) (membership clause of the Smith
Act) :
"That ... the defendant has been a member of the Communist Party . . . well-
knowing . .. that said Communist Party 'was and is . . . a group. .. of persons
who ... advocate the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United
States by force and violence....'"
and with the charge in Scales v. United States 227 F.2d 581, 592 (4th Cir. 1955) ("defen-
dant became or remained a member of an organization advocating the forcible overthrow
of the government. . . ."). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
In addition, the law officer advised the court that the charge brought under art. 134
"pertains to that portion of [the Smith Act] which denounces the affiliation of the
accused . . . ." Reprinted in Final Brief on behalf of Accused, pp. 14-45, United States
v. Blevens, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 480, 18 C.M.R. 104 (1955). See also United States v. Blevens,
5 U.S.C.M.A. 480, 483, 18 C.M.R. 104, 107 (1955). The ten years maximum punishment
authorized by the Smith Act was used as a frame of reference in determining the sentence
for Blevens' discreditable conduct conviction. Id. at 491-92, 18 C.M.R. at 115-16.
15. Such specific intent must be shown in order to establish a violation of § 2(a) (3)
of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385, para. 3 (1952). Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 499-500 (1951) ; cf. Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680, 686-89 (1944).
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tary Appeals held that a violation of article 134 had still been alleged, since
the charge included all essential elements of a discreditable conduct offense.10
Yet affiliation with a group advocating violent overthrow remained the grav-
amen of the conviction. The government did not allege that Blevens' activities,
in themselves, tended to injure the reputation of the armed forces; his experi-
ences in East Germany served only to establish affiliation with a Communist
group. Such affiliation constitutes an exercise of political activity falling with-
in the scope of the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech and
assembly.' 7
With a constitutional issue before it, the court should have determined the
applicability of the First Amendment to service personnel. Although military
requirements may necessitate some limitations on freedom of expression, mem-
bers of the armed forces are not totally denied the guarantees of the First
Amendment. Certain constitutional rights are clearly inapplicable to service-
men. For example, the Fifth Amendment specifically exempts military per-
16. United States v. Blevens, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 480, 483, 18 C.M.R. 104, 107 (1955).
The absence of essential elements of civilian crimes does not preclude the applicability
of the first and second clauses of art. 134. See note 2 supra.
17. The term "speech" is used in a broad sense in the First Amendment and includes
a wide variety of forms of expression. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 501-02 (1952) (motion pictures) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (picket-
ing) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1.931) (displaying a flag).
Blevens was essentially punished for the same type of political activity which the Smith
Act proscribes. See notes 13-14 supra. Section 2(a) (3) of the Smith Act makes unlaw-
ful organizing or attempting to organize, being a member of, or affiliating with, any group
which advocates the violent overthrow of the government. 18 U.S.C. § 2385, para. 3 (1952).
No cases have yet arisen under the affiliation provision of this section. But cases under
other clauses of § 2(a) (3) indicate that affiliation would fall under the First Amendment.
For example, the Supreme Court has held that the activity proscribed by the organizing
provision of the Smith Act contains an element of "speech" as that term is used in the
First Amendment. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See also Gorfinkel &
Mack, Dennis v. United States and the Clear and Present Danger Rule, 39 CALIF. L. REV
475, 484-87, 488-89 (1951); Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenc" to
Dennis, 52 COLum. L. REv. 313, 330 (1952). Subsequent cases considering the organiz-
ing provision and the membership provision have ruled that First Amendment activity is
involved. United States v. Lightfoot, 228 F.2d 861, 868-70 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 76 Sup.
Ct. 543 (1956) (membership provision) ; Yates v. United States, 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 350 U.S. 860 (1955) (organizing provision) ; cf. United States v. Flynn,
216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 909 (1955) (advocacy). Only the
Fourth Circuit has departed from this view. Scales v. United States, 227 F.2d 581 (4th Cir.
1.955) (membership provision) ; Frankfeld v. United States, 198 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 922 (1953) (organizing provision). But see opinion denying a petition
for rehearing. 198 F.2d at 690.
That Blevens' affiliation with a Communist group occurred in a foreign country does
not mean that the constitutional protections afforded by the Bill of Rights can be denied
the accused. Cf. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (double jeopardy provision of
Fifth Amendment applicable to court-martial of soldier accused of rape committed in Ger-
many) ; United States v. Greer, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 576, 13 C.M.R. 132 (1953) (constitutional
right against self-incrimination violated during court-martial for crime committed in Korea).
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sonnel from the right to a grand jury presentment.' s And since the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of trial by jury applies only when this procedural right
was accorded under the common law, an accused is not entitled to a jury trial
in a military court.' But no such exceptions are contained in the First Amend-
ment; on the contrary, judges have indicated that the broad language of the
First Amendment encompasses the armed forces.2 0 Such a conclusion seems
warranted in an era of widespread compulsory military service,21 for the right
of free expression of a large segment of the community should not be subject
to unlimited restrictions on the basis of a military status which may be in-
voluntary.22
Since Blevens' conviction may have abridged protected speech, the court
should have considered whether the abridgement met constitutional require-
18. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
19. Ex parle Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1942) ; Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335, 340
(1952), aff'd sub nor. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
20. When previously presented with a First Amendment issue, the members of the
Court of Military Appeals had expressly stated that First Amendment protections apply
to the military. United States v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 531, 16 C.M.R. 83, 105
(1954) (Quinn, C.J.) ; id. at 535, 16 C.M.R. at 109 (Latimer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ; id. at 545, 552, 16 C.M.R. at 119, 126 (Brosman, J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Quinn has declared that servicemen retain all constitutional rights except for those
specifically denied them by the Constitution itself. Id. at 531, 16 C.M.R. at 105; United
States v. Sutton, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 228, 11 C.M.R. 220, 228 (1953) (dissent). See also
WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 1, at 656. All the above judges recognize limitations on
the First Amendment rights of servicemen similar to those discussed in the text at notes
28-31 infra. But their opinions reflect the belief that the amendment is applicable to the
armed forces.
The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that servicemen do not sacrifice their consti-
tutional rights by virtue of their military status. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953).
The Court of Military Appeals has expressed the same view. United States v. Voorhees,
supra; United States v. Deain, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 44, 50, 17 C.M.R. 44, 50 (1954); United
States v. Sutton, supra at 228 (dissenting opinion). But see United States v. Deain, supra
at 56, 17 C.M.R. at 56 (concurring opinion). And specific constitutional guarantees have
been held to apply to the military. E.g., Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (right
against double jeopardy) ; Powers v. Hunter, 178 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1949) (right against
cruel and unusual punishment) ; United States v. Greer, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 576, 13 C.M.R. 132
(1953) (right against self-incrimination). See also Comment, Military Justice and the
Constitutiou-hnzprovements Offered by the New Uniform Code of Military Justice, 29
TEXAs L. REv. 651 (1951.) ; Comment, Constitutional Rights of Persons before a Court
Martial, 3 DE PAUL L. RFv. 95 (1953).
21. All male citizens of the United States between the ages of 18Y2 and 26 years are
liable for service in the armed forces of the United States unless they qualify under ex-
ceptions to the present Selective Service Act, 62 STAT. 604 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C.
app. § 454 (1952).
22. Cf. the reasoning of the Attorney General holding the Hatch Act, which requires
dismissal of federal employees actively engaged in political activities, inapplicable to ser-
vicemen during effective periods of Selective Service Acts: "'. . . Congress could have
contemplated only officers and employees... who could exercise a choice between a politi-
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ments. The rights guaranteed by the First Amendment are not absolute free-
doms,23 and a balancing of conflicting interests may show the need for some
restriction. 24 Though individuals should be free to express themselves on con-
troversial subjects in order that the truth may emerge,25 other substantial in-
terests of society may clash with the exercise of free speech. In the resolution
of this conflict speech may be constitutionally restricted only if two conditions
are fulfilled: (1) the conflicting interest of society is so substantial that its
impairment is a substantive evil which Congress has a right to prevent,20 and
(2) the particular exercise of speech creates a clear and present danger of this
substantive evil.27
When applied to the military these prerequisites take on a particular stamp,
for freedom of expression in the armed forces is subject to limitations not
present in a civilian setting. The purpose of the military establishment is to
cal career and Government office or employment. No such choice exists for an officer or
enlisted man ordered to active duty without his consent.'" 40 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 103 (1941.).
For discussion of both the social interest and military benefit in maintaining freedom
of speech in the military, see CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 461-62 (1941).
23. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503, 508 (1951); id. at 524-25
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 581 (Douglas, J., dissenting on other grounds);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). And see, generally, CHAFEE,
op. cit. supra note 22; EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES cc. IV-VIII (1952).
24. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) ; Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ; Dennis v. United States, supra note 23, at 524-25 (concurring
opinion) ; CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 22, at 31, 35.
25. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) ; American Communi-
cations Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394-95 (1950) ; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,
4 (1949) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) ; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 365 (1937) ; CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 22, at 31-35.
26. The Supreme Court has found the following to be substantial interests which may
be protected even though their protection abridges the right to speak: protection of the
government from overthrow by violence, Dennis v. United States, supra note 25; public
safety, morality or health, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 536 (1945) ; regulated use of
the public highways to assure safety and convenience, Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569, 574 (1941); reasonable quiet protected from loud and raucous noises from sound
amplifier trucks, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) ; welfare of children, Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
On the other hand, some interests have been held too inconsequential to warrant re-
striction of speech. E.g., property rights of a corporation owning an entire town, Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); registration for identification purposes, Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 526, 540 (1945); prevention of crime and protection of householder
from annoyance and intrusion, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145 (1943) ; pre-
venting mere animosity in listeners, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940).
27. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), is the leading recent Supreme Court
discussion of the meaning and application of the clear and present danger test. Cases ex-
pounding the doctrine are collected in the appendix to the opinion of Justice Frankfurter.
Id. at 556-61 (concurring opinion). For discussions of what the clear and present danger
test means in view of the Dennis decision, see, e.g., Antieau, Dennis v. United States-
Precedent, Principle or Perversion?, 5 VAND. L. REV. 141 (1952); Gorfinkel & Mack,
supra note 17; Mendelson, supra note 17.
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NOTES
serve as an effective fighting force capable of preserving national security. 28
This purpose is a substantial interest which narrows the scope of permissible
First Amendment activities. Accordingly, penal sanctions 29 may be imposed
on a serviceman for an exercise of speech which obstructs the purpose of the
military. Good order and discipline are essential to military effectiveness.30
Thus, any impairment of these requirements by an exercise of speech creates,
as a matter of law, a clear and present danger to the substantial interest of
national security. 31
In contrast, discrediting the armed forces by engaging in forms of unor-
thodox political expression during off-duty hours should not be punishable per
28. See, e.g., United States v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 531, 16 C.M.R. 83, 105
(1954) ; Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services on
H.R. 2498, 81st Cong., ist Sess. 779, 816 (1949) ; Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Armed Services on S. 857 and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 176,
224 (1949) (hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings).
29. Connection with organizations advocating violent overthrow of the government
may warrant dismissal from the armed forces. DEP'r OF DEFENsE DIRECrIVE No. 5210.9,
ff VII (April 7, 1954) (Military Personnel Security Program Directive) ; Special Regu-
lations 600-220-1, ffff 10, 11, 30c(7), 33c (June 18, 1954) (Military Personnel Security
Program, Army Regulations) ; Hatch Act, 53 STAT. 1148 (1939), as amended, 5 U.S.C.
§ llSj (1952). Similarly, dismissal may follow from taking an active part in political
campaigns. Hatch Act, supra at § 118i. But see 40 Ops. Ai-r'y Gsw. 103, 105-06 (1941),
discussed at note 22 supra.
If Blevens had merely been discharged from the army for affiliating with the SSD, such
a non-penal sanction would not have violated the First Amendment. Adler v. Board of
Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) ;
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Yet, when penal sanctions, rather
than mere dismissal from government service, are employed to enforce prohibitions of
"speech" activity, the demands of the First Amendment must be met. E.g., Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). This
distinction between penal and non-penal sanctions has been considered "crucial." Ameri-
can Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 408 (1950).
30. E.g., Comments from Members of Judge Advocates Association on Questionnaires
on the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Senate Hearings 227; see also Statement on
Behalf of the American Legion, id. at 176.
31. Speech interfering with loyalty and discipline has been considered such a serious
threat to military success that it may be the basis in itself for applying penal sanctions.
E.g., Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920) ; id. at 272 (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ.,
dissenting on other grounds) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ; Dunne v.
United States, 138 F.2d 137, 140-41, 145 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943);
United States v. McQuaid, 5 C.f.R. 525 (1952) ; cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 504 (1951) ; Sanford v. Callan, 148 F.2d 376 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 679
(1945).
Specific articles of the Uniform Code proscribe "speech" activity in order to maintain
discipline. E.g., art. 89 (disrespect towards superior officer) ; art. 91(3) (insubordinate
conduct towards noncommissioned officer by language or deportment) ; art. 117 (provok-
ing speeches or gestures). See also art. 88, which prohibits contempt toward high govern-
mental officials. Members of the Senate subcommittee expressed concern over the restric-
tions which this article placed on freedom of expression. Senate Hearings at 330-33; cf.
id. at 209. There are no reported cases under the Uniform Code employing art. 88 and its
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se. 2 The international and domestic reputation of the military is important,
but less essential to military success than good order and discipline.33 In light
of its indirect relation to the purpose of the military, injury to reputation,
standing alone, should not be considered a substantive evil warranting restric-
tion of First Amendment rights.3 4 If discreditability were considered such a
substantive evil, a serviceman's political expressions could be punished merely
because of their unpopularity. For an exercise of speech by a serviceman tends
to discredit the armed forces if it offends the standards of the community.35
Yet political activities cannot be restricted merely under a standard of com-
munity disapproval; that is the very basis for punishment which the First
Amendment was designed to prohibit.3 6
Impairment of military reputation by the exercise of political activities must
be distinguished, however, from impairment by conduct entailing no element
predecessor section was seldom used. Id. at 332. But see Sanford v. Callan, 148 F.2d 376
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 679 (1945) (affirming conviction under predecessor of
art. 88).
Military personnel are also forbidden to engage in outside activities, including political
ones, if this would interfere with the full and proper discharge of their duties. E.g., Army
Regulations No. 600-10, 1111 12a, 18c(1) (Dec. 15, 1953).
32. When an exercise of political expression reflecting lack of sympathy with Ameri-
can military goals or foreign policy occurs in the course of official duty or in the presence
of other military personnel, it may be punished as conduct prejudicial to good order and
discipline. United States v. McQuaid, 5 C.M.R. 525, 530 (1952) (poster criticizing mili-
tary effort placed on door of air force base library). Yet, when such an exercise of speech
occurs away from a military post and is 'not directed toward military personnel, it is
punishable, if at all, as conduct of a nature to discredit the armed forces. Cf. United States
v. Hughes, 7 C.M.R. 803, 810 (1953) (misconduct held unrelated to military discipline
and thus could only be punished as discreditable conduct).
33. Conduct injuring the reputation of the armed forces was not made punishable until
1916. Even then it was inserted only for a collateral purpose and not as a factor essential
to military success. See note 4 supra.
In terms of national security, the reputation of the armed forces is important in two
areas: (1) hostile countries must entertain a high regard for American military strength
so that they will be deterred from initiating aggression; and (2) American civilians must
have a favorable opinion of the armed forces so that they will support the efforts and have
confidence in the ability of the military.
34. For other interests which have been held too insubstantial to justify suppression
of First Amendment freedoms, see note 26 supra.
35. The discreditable conduct clause of art. 134 may be employed to punish activities
which, though not illegal, are regarded with disfavor in the community. E.g., art. 134 may
be used to punish servicemen for failure to pay just debts. MANUAL 1 213b; United States
v. Andrews, 9 C.M.R. 667,673-74 (1953).
36. "Plainly a community may not suppress . . . the dissemination of views because
they are unpopular, annoying or distasteful .... That would be a complete repudiation
of the philosophy of the Bill of Rights." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116
(1943). See also Brief of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar Ass'n
as Amicus Curiae, p. 8, Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ("no principle could be more
destructive of . . . free speech than to judge [its] permissability by any standard of its
popularity") ; CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 22, at 481-82.
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of speech. Restriction of "conduct" is permissible if reasonably related to pro-
tection of a substantial interest.3 7 But "speech" is shielded from punishment
by the First Amendment safeguard of freedom of expression; it may not be
suppressed without a showing of clear and present danger to a substantial in-
terest.38 Accordingly, discreditable speech may not be punished merely because
it injures military reputation, since reputation is not essential to military suc-
cess.3o But discreditable conduct, not having the social value or constitutional
protection afforded to speech, can be punished because reputation is reason-
ably related to military success.
Moreover, since discreditable conduct can be punished, the advocacy of such
conduct may be subjected to penal sanctions if the speech creates a clear and
present danger that the conduct will result.40 In Blevens, however, the justi-
fication for punishing an exercise of speech was not that the speech advocated
and tended to incite discreditable actions by servicemen. Blevens' political
activities were punished only because the reputation of the United States Army
was injured as an incidental, unintended effect of his affiliation with a Com-
munist group.41 The government presumably feared that members of the com-
37. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525, 537-39 (1934) ("reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose") ; cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-54 (1938).
38. The Supreme Court has frequently asserted that restriction of speech requires a
greater likelihood of substantial injury than restriction of conduct. Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) ; Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161
(1939) ; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Thus,
First Amendment rights are often said to occupy a "preferred position." E.g., Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) ; see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30
(1945) ; Mason, The Core of Free Government, 1938-40: Mr. Justice Stone and "Preferred
Freedoms," 65 YALE L.J. 597 (1956). But, for a critical analysis and chronological account
of the development of the "preferred position" doctrine, see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 89-97 (1949) (concurring opinion).
39. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
40. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (advocacy of violent overthrow
of government punishable when clear and present danger of attempted overthrow). Injury
to military reputation by conduct, in contrast to injury by speech, may be classified a "sub-
stantive evil," see note 26 supra and accompanying text, because conduct lacks the social
value of speech and may properly be suppressed to protect the reputation of the armed
forces.
41. An exercise of speech advocating illegal action must be distinguished from an
exercise of speech which may lead to illegal action, or other harmful consequences, un-
desired by the speaker. For example, advocacy of unlawful rioting may be constitutionally
suppressed if it creates a clear and present danger of a riot ensuing. Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1951) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (dictum).
But speech which is otherwise protected by the First Amendment may not be quashed en
the ground that listeners, enraged by the speaker's remarks, will engage in violence. Ter-
miniello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949), reversing 400 Ill. 23, 79 N.E.2d 39 (1948) ;
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) ; cf. CaAFEE, op. Cit. supra note 22, at 422-35.
Similarly, the distribution of handbills may not be suppressed on the ground that recipients
litter the streets with them-a result not intended by the speaker. Schneider v. Town of
Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
1956] 1215
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
munity who knew of Blevens' political associations would, as a result, enter-
tain a less favorable opinion of the armed forces. Yet, the Supreme Court has
held that the mere subjective effect on "listeners" of speech not advocating
illegal action on their part is not by itself a substantive evil justifying the sup-
pression of First Amendment activity. 42
If injury to military reputation by political expressions is not a substantive
evil in itself, discreditable speech can be punished only if it creates a clear and
present danger of something that is a substantive evil. 43 In many instances, a
serviceman's expressions of belief, including association with controversial
political groups, might conceivably impair the reputation of the armed forces.44
The discredit resulting from a particular exercise of speech may be so signifi-
cant that it constitutes a clear and present danger to national security or mili-
tary success. Whenever such danger is established, punishment of speech will
be consistent with constitutional requirements. Thus, the court must consider
the circumstances surrounding the exercise of speech 45-the extent of the im-
pairment of military reputation and the resulting potential repercussions. The
following factors are relevant to this inquiry :46 whether the accused was wear-
ing his uniform at the time he engaged in discreditable forms of political ex-
pression, whether the military status of the speaker was otherwise brought
home to those who observed him, whether the United States was at war,
whether the exercise of speech was of such a nature that a substantial segment
of the community would be aware of it, whether the political expression took
42. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145 (1943) (annoyance resulting from
door-to-door distribution of leaflets advertising religious meetings) ; Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (animosity resulting from playing anti-Catholic record in
Catholic neighborhood) ; ef. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 81-83 (1949) (statute prohibit-
ing sound amplifying devices emitting "loud and raucous" noises is constitutional regu-
lation of speech, though absolute prohibition of all sound amplification would be uncon-
stitutional) ; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
43. See text at notes 26-27 supra.
44. Although the facts in Blevens are unique, a serviceman's conduct could be con-
sidered discreditable in more common situations. For example, a soldier on furlough might
actively participate in a meeting advocating the recognition of Communist China or forcible
resistance to the racial integration of public schools. In each case, the same constitutional
prerequisites would have to be met before the conduct could be punished.
45. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.).
46. For factors which the Supreme Court has deemed relevant in other free speech
cases, see, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510-11 (1951) (inter alia, a highly
organized conspiracy, rigidly disciplined members subject to their leaders' call, the inflam-
mable nature of world conditions) ; id. at 587-89 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.) (the
nature of Communism as a force on the world scene; the strength, numbers and tactical
positions in strategic jobs of defendants and their followers; whether the Communists are
known to the FBI and can be quickly rounded up in case of war) ; Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1919) (whether defendant who circulated newspaper designed
to obstruct recruiting made special effort to reach men who were subject to the draft;
whether the circulation of the paper was in areas where defendant knew "a little breath
would be enough to kindle a flame") ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)
(whether the nation was at war).
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place in an area where the prestige of the United States military was of par-
ticular importance to national security. 47
Accordingly, the Court of Military Appeals should have determined whether
the discredit to the army resulting from Blevens' affiliation with the SSD was,
in light of the surrounding circumstances, a clear and present danger to na-
tional security. East Germany is a crucial area in the Cold War, and members
of an official agency of that government knew that Blevens was a United States
soldier. On the other hand, the United States was not at war, Blevens did not
wear his uniform while in East Germany, and only a scant segment of the
East German populace was aware of his activities. 48  In addition, domestic
public opinion of the military was presumably unaffected by Blevens' conduct,
since the government did not show that news of his activities was circulated
in this country. On balance, it would seem that the injury to the reputation
of the services caused by Blevens' association with a Communist organization
did not create a clear and present danger to national security or military suc-
cess. Undoubtedly, Blevens' conduct deserved punishment.49 But the convic-
tion, based as it is on an exercise of speech without any consideration of the
constitutional issue, establishes an unfortunate precedent for military courts.
47. Military courts have recognized that factors analogous to the foregoing may be
relevant in determining whether misconduct is of a nature to discredit the armed forces.
Compare United States v. McGlone, 18 C.M.R. 525, 532 (1954) (misconduct held dis-
creditable when observed by military personnel and civilian employees), with United States
v. Walters, 11 C.M.R. 355, 362-63 (1953) (same misconduct held not discreditable in ab-
sence of other circumstances). But see United States v. McMurtry, 1 C.M.R. 715, 719
(1951) (drunkenness in public place discreditable, though accused was in civilian clothes;
conviction not dependent on whether onlookers know at the time that accused is in the
service). Even if an unpopular exercise of political expression may be held discreditable
because observed by others, the extent of the publicity and the seriousness of the discredit
must still be investigated to determine whether the speech may be constitutionally punished.
48. Blevens was given civilian clothing by SSD agents. He was also given an identi-
fication pass and instructed to say that he was a Russian if anyone asked. United States v.
Blevens, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 480, 488, 18 C.M.R. 104, 112 (1955).
49. Activities in connection with overthrow of the government by force and violence
may properly be prohibited. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Such activi-
ties are especially condemnable when carried on by military personnel. Most likely a con-
viction under the Smith Act could have been obtained if the prosecution had been properly
conducted. See also 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1952) (prohibiting private dealings with foreign
government by American citizen with intent to influence policy of that country toward
United States).
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